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United Parcel Service of America, Inc.
Defendant - Appellee
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Amicus on Behalf of Appellant
Appeal from United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines
Submitted: October 17, 2017 
Filed: May 11, 2018
Before SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN, LOKEN, MURPHY, COLLOTON, 
GRUENDER, BENTON, SHEPHERD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges, En Banc:
Judge Erickson, Judge Grasz, and Judge Stras did not participate in the 
consideration or decision of this matter.
LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
Jerry Faidley brought two state court actions against his former employer, 
United Parcel Service of America, Inc. (UPS), alleging that UPS violated the Iowa 
Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Iowa Code § 216, when it placed him on medical leave from 
his long time position as a package car driver and then failed to reasonably 
accommodate his physical disability. After UPS removed the actions based on 
diversity of citizenship, Faidley filed an amended complaint in the first action adding 
claims of disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. The two actions were consolidated and the 
district court1 granted summary judgment in favor of UPS. Faidley appealed. A 
divided panel of this court reversed in part and remanded. Faidley v. United Parcel 
Serv. of Am., Inc., 853 F.3d 447 (8th Cir. 2017). We granted rehearing en banc and 
vacated the panel opinion. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
has submitted an amicus brief in support of plaintiff Faidley. Reviewing the grant of 
summary judgment de novo, we affirm the district court.
I. Background
A. The First Action. Faidley began working as a UPS package car driver in 
1987, making residential and business deliveries and picking up commercial 
packages. He suffered a work-related back injury in February 2010 and was assigned 
to temporary alternate work (TAW) until April 2010. In February 2011, he suffered 
another work-related injury and was off work receiving worker’s compensation 
benefits until June 2011. In October 2011, he had hip replacement surgery to treat 
a degenerative hip condition, which he described as “a different medical issue than 
the back pain” in 2010. He began physical therapy in November 2011. His
1The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Judge of the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Iowa.
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orthopaedic surgeon, Dr. Devon Goetz, released Faidley to return to work with no 
restrictions on April 26, 2012.
Faidley testified that when he returned to work as a package car driver, he 
requested an eight-hour day the first day he drove, and UPS gave him a lighter-than- 
normal day that he completed in 8.27 hours. His second day of driving was 
exceptionally heavy, taking 9.65 hours to complete and leaving him “sore and [with] 
some pain in my back.” He worked 6.12 hours the third day. When Faidley saw that 
his fourth “plan day” was scheduled to be almost 12 hours, he told his supervisor, 
“The way I’m feeling there’s no way I can get that done.” After consulting the union 
steward and an occupational nurse, UPS made an appointment for Faidley to see Dr. 
Goetz on May 15 and told him, “You are done until you get in to the doctor.” 
However, UPS contacted Faidley when it was short drivers the following week and 
offered to “take it easy on you” if he returned to work. Faidley said he was feeling 
better and returned to his package car position, working between 6.84 and 9.53 hours 
from May 7 to 14, 2012.
On May 15, Faidley visited Dr. Goetz with a nurse hired by UPS. The three 
discussed the trouble Faidley was having and concluded that Dr. Goetz should issue 
a “Patient Status Report” stating that Faidley could return to work but with a 
permanent restriction limiting him to working no more than eight hours a day. 
Faidley testified that he handed Dr. Goetz’s Status Report to his station manager, 
Scott Schmitz, at work the following morning. Schmitz said, “Congratulations, your 
career at UPS is now over. . . . UPS won’t allow anybody to work with a permanent 
restriction.” Schmitz told Faidley he could not work with that restriction. They 
consulted the union steward, who said to Faidley, “Go home.”
On May 17, Faidley faxed UPS that he “would still like to continue working 
at UPS even if it means a job with-in or out-side my current classification. I am 
hopeful that . . . there is something available for me.” Properly treating this as an
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employee request for an ADA accommodation, UPS immediately sent Faidley a 
Request for Medical Information form to be completed by his physician. On June 18, 
Faidley returned the form to UPS.2 On July 24, Faidley attended an “accommodation 
checklist meeting” with UPS Occupational Health Supervisors Jurgen Rosner and 
Terra Vellema, and District Human Resources Manager Vince Blood. The purpose 
of the meeting, as stated in UPS’s ADA Procedural Compliance Manual, was:
to engage in a good faith, interactive meeting with the employee in order 
to determine whether the employee can be accommodated in his current 
job and, if not, to determine whether there are any other positions that 
are currently available, or that will become available within a reasonable 
period of time for which he is qualified, and for which he can perform 
the essential job functions with or without accommodation.
Faidley submitted an Accommodation Checklist stating that he requested an 
accommodation because of “my hip replacement surgery and my lumbar degenerative 
disk disease and right hip osteoarthritis,” that he had hip and back pain “after 8 hours 
of repetitive lifting, walking, climbing, standing,” and that he “could currently do my 
bid route if it was dispatched between 8 and 8.50 hours of work a day.” With regard 
to other UPS positions, Faidley stated:
with an 8.0 hr accommodation, I believe I could do any job at UPS that 
I’m aware of such as car washer, porter jobs, preload airdriver - air ramp 
or hub positions. Without an accommodation, I’m not aware of any jobs 
that I would be able to do. Preload-air driver is best position I could 
think of.
The day after the meeting, Faidley sent an email to the three UPS attendees urging 
UPS to grant his request for an eight-hour accommodation as a package car driver:
2We cannot find a copy of this document in either party’s Appendix.
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I really believe that UPS should put [m]e back to working the delivery 
driver position i have held for 25 years. During the time that i held that 
position i rarely had to work overtime. In fact, i regularly earned the 
production bonus because i completed my stops in eight hours or less.
There are around 100 drivers at the Des Moines center and i am sure that 
any additional work could be managed by other drivers who want to 
work overtime. I would appreciate it if the company would reconsider 
its position that all drivers have to work overtime.
After the meeting, the UPS regional review committee determined that Faidley 
could not be accommodated in his current package car driver position, because its 
essential functions included being able to work nine and one-half hours a day, and 
sometimes more. The committee discussed reassigning Faidley to other positions as 
a possible accommodation. The positions identified by Faidley -- car washer, porter, 
and preload air-driver inside or hub jobs -- were identified as full-time eight-hour jobs 
for which Faidley was qualified, and he was encouraged to bid on those jobs when 
available. In addition, Blood raised the possibility of Faidley becoming a “feeder 
driver” who drives semi-tractor trailers between UPS locations, a job that requires 
working more than eight hours a day and for which Faidley would need training, but 
one that does not require as much walking, lifting, and climbing in and out of the 
truck as the package car driver job. Blood testified that he was asked whether feeder 
jobs were “currently available” and was told not to list that job when he answered 
“No.” In opposing summary judgment, Faidley submitted an affidavit averring he 
“was unaware that UPS considered the position of a Feeder Driver as a potential 
accommodation” and opining, “I could have performed that position” for the required 
9.5 hours per day “because it did not require me to get in and out of the truck 
frequently [nor] require me to do any significant lifting.”
Faidley was unable to obtain reassignment to any of the alternative full-time 
jobs he had suggested. Some had no vacancies, and he lacked the seniority to 
successfully bid on others. As a result, UPS instead offered him a part-time inside job
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on August 9, 2012. He declined that offer because it would reduce his seniority and 
bidding rights. Faidley remained a UPS employee on medical leave. He filed the first 
action in January 2013. As amended after removal, Faidley claims that UPS failed 
to accommodate his disability in violation of the ADA and the ICRA.
B. The Second Action. Faidley testified that he filed a grievance with the 
local union objecting to not being able to work. At a state-level proceeding, UPS and 
union representatives stated that his eight-hour work restriction was “the biggest 
drawback” to successfully bidding on other full-time UPS positions. Faidley returned 
to Dr. Goetz in January 2013. They reviewed other non-driver positions, including 
“car washer, porter, loader, unloader, preloader.” On January 24, Dr. Goetz issued 
revised restrictions stating that Faidley could perform any job other than package car 
driver with no hourly restriction.3 Faidley then bid on a number of positions and won 
a full-time combined loader/preloader position on February 4, 2013.
The loader position required stacking packages in semi-trailer trucks, while the 
preloader position required loading packages into delivery trucks. When the 
combined position caused Faidley too much pain, he returned to Dr. Goetz, who 
issued a Patient Status Report recommending that Faidley “work 4 hrs/day at pre­
loader job (not as repetitive and strenuous as Loader Job)” until his next visit on 
March 28. In response to an email from Faidley’s worker’s compensation lawyer, 
UPS’s worker’s compensation lawyer advised that Faidley’s combination job “is not 
an accommodated position that he received through the ADA process” because Dr. 
Goetz had stated that Faidley could do any job other than package car driver without 
an eight-hour restriction, and that UPS “is unable to accommodate the current 4-hour 
restriction” because Faidley had used all of his TAW time.4 In response, Faidley’s
3We cannot find a copy of this document in either party’s Appendix.
4Temporary alternate work time is defined and limited under UPS’s collective 
bargaining agreement with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.
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ADA attorney wrote UPS’s ADA attorney asserting (i) UPS “stubbornly refuses to 
recognize” Faidley’s ability to perform the essential functions of the package car 
driver position with an eight-hour accommodation; (ii) UPS has refused to engage in 
the accommodation process required by the ADA and instead “has left Mr. Faidley 
to blindly apply for positions”; and (iii) Dr. Goetz’s authorization of a return to work 
for four hours per day for five weeks “is an accommodation request for part-time 
work as a work-hardening program.”
Faidley returned to Dr. Goetz on March 3, 2013. Dr. Goetz issued a “Physician 
Note” stating that he and Faidley had agreed on the following permanent restrictions: 
no hourly restriction; minimal lifting above shoulder height (no more than twice per 
hour); and no lifting greater than seventy pounds. UPS then began a second ADA 
accommodation process and met with Faidley in May 2013. His Accommodation 
Checklist listed his current job as “Article 22-3, midnight loader-preload.” He 
identified as possible other positions Car Washer, Porter, Clerk, Spa, Air Driver, and 
his former delivery route minus a commercial customer that involved picking up 
heavy packages. After an exchange of emails, Blood’s successor advised Faidley on 
July 10 that UPS was looking for available full-time Car Washer, Porter, Clerk, and 
Spa positions but determined he could not perform the essential functions of the other 
positions because of his medical lifting restrictions. In September 2013, having 
found no full-time position on which Faidley could successfully bid, UPS offered him 
another part-time position. He declined, electing instead to retire in November 2013.
In February 2014, Faidley filed the second action, alleging ICRA disability 
discrimination. He also alleged unlawful retaliation because he had pursued an 
accommodation and filed his first complaint.5 The district court granted summary
5On appeal, the panel in Part II.C. of its opinion unanimously concluded that 
Faidley did not address the ICRA retaliation claim in his opening brief and therefore 
waived it. We reinstate Part II.C. of the panel’s opinion.
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judgment in favor of UPS, concluding (i) Faidley was not constructively discharged 
and therefore suffered no adverse employment action; (ii) working more than eight 
hours a day was an essential job function of the package car driver position that could 
not be accommodated; (iii) Faidley was not qualified for reassignment to a feeder 
driver position because working nine to ten-hour days was an essential job function 
and Dr. Goetz had unambiguously limited Faidley to working no more than eight 
hours per day; (iv) UPS’s TAW program exceeds ADA requirements and its 
parameters are therefore irrelevant; (v) because the part-time positions UPS offered 
Faidley were reasonable accommodations, Faidley “was not qualified to remain at 
UPS” after he rejected them; and (vi) a reasonable jury could not find that UPS acted 
in bad faith in conducting an interactive accommodation process.
On appeal, a divided panel reversed in part and remanded. As to the 2012 
disability discrimination claim, the panel agreed that Faidley was not qualified to be 
a package car driver because he could not perform the essential job function of 
working more than eight hours per day. However, the majority concluded, the district 
court erred in granting summary judgment because there was evidence that Faidley 
appeared capable of performing the essential job functions of the feeder driver 
position, and that feeder driver positions would become open in the near future. The 
panel affirmed the dismissal of the 2013 disability discrimination claim because 
Faidley failed to offer sufficient evidence that he was able to perform the essential job 
functions of any available position, or that UPS failed to make a good faith effort to 
help him in seeking an accommodation. This rehearing en banc followed.
II. Discussion
The ADA bars private employers from discriminating against a “qualified 
individual on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Discrimination is 
defined to include “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical
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or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified [employee] with a disability.” 42 
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). To establish aprimafacie case of discrimination under the 
ADA, Faidley must show that he “(1) is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) 
is a qualified individual under the ADA, and (3) suffered an adverse employment 
decision because of the disability.” Kallail v. Alliant Energy Corp. Servs., Inc., 691 
F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 2012). A “qualified individual” is a person “who, with or 
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the 
employment position that [he] holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). ADA and 
ICRA disability discrimination claims are analyzed in the same fashion. Kallail, 691 
F.3d at 930.
A. UPS does not dispute that Faidley’s physical impairments were disabling. 
To be a qualified individual under the ADA, Faidley must “possess the requisite skill, 
education, experience, and training for [his] position.” Id. (quotation omitted). UPS 
also does not dispute that Faidley possessed the requisite skill, education, experience 
and training to continue performing his package car driver position. Thus, the first 
issue on appeal -- and Faidley’s primary focus throughout this litigation -- is whether 
UPS discriminated against Faidley on account of his disability when it refused to 
accommodate his request that he be permitted to work as a package car driver subject 
to Dr. Goetz’s May 15, 2012 restriction limiting Faidley to an eight-hour work day.
UPS declined Faidley’s requested accommodation based on its determination 
that being able to work more than eight hours a day was an “essential function” of the 
package car driver job. In moving for summary judgment on this issue, UPS 
explained that overtime is an essential function of the package car driver position 
because daily package car workloads can increase unpredictably, particularly during 
the year-end holiday busy season, and drivers encounter unpredictable weather 
conditions while completing their routes. If a driver is unable to deliver all the 
packages in his vehicle within eight hours, and is restricted from working overtime,
- 9 -
other drivers must be sent to finish the deliveries, or packages will not be timely 
delivered; either alternative adversely affects UPS’s business. The requirement to 
work overtime was listed in UPS’s package car driver job description, and the issue 
was collectively bargained with the Teamsters Union, with UPS agreeing to assign 
package car drivers less than 9.5 hour work days and permitting drivers to request 
two workdays without overtime per month. Faidley argued that working overtime 
was not an essential job function because he usually completed his route in less than 
eight hours. But he admitted that he did work overtime, as the above-summarized 
work days in April and May 2012 make clear, and that additional work would have 
to be reassigned to other drivers in the field if he was prohibited from working 
overtime and could not complete his deliveries in eight hours.
The district court concluded that a reasonable jury could only find that the 
ability to work overtime was an essential function of Faidley’s package car driver job. 
The panel agreed, see Faidley, 853 F.3d at 450, and we confirm that ruling. We agree 
with the district court that UPS satisfied its burden of proof on this fact-intensive 
issue, which turns on factors such as the employer’s judgment, its written job 
description, the terms of any applicable collective bargaining agreement, and the 
consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function. See Scruggs 
v. Pulaski Cty., 817 F.3d 1087, 1092-93 (8th Cir. 2016); Rehrs v. Iams Co., 486 F.3d 
353, 356 (8th Cir. 2007). “[A] task may be an essential function even if the employee 
performs it for only a few minutes each week.” Minnihan v. Mediacom Commc’ns 
Corp., 779 F.3d 803, 812 (8th Cir. 2015). Therefore, UPS did not violate the ADA 
or ICRA by refusing Faidley’s request for an eight-hour work day because that 
accommodation would have made him unqualified to perform the essential job 
functions of a package car driver.6
6The EEOC as amicus did not address this issue.
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B. Faidley further argues that UPS failed to reasonably accommodate him 
when it did not offer the feeder driver position identified by Human Resources 
Director Blood in preparing for the July 2012 accommodation checklist meeting with 
Faidley. When an accommodation is not possible in an employee’s current position, 
“reassignment to a vacant position” may be a reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12in(9)(B ); see Kallail, 691 F.3d at 933. “[T]he definition of ‘qualified individual 
with a disability’ includes a disabled employee who cannot do his or her current job, 
but who desires and can perform, with or without reasonable accommodation, the 
essential functions of a vacant job within the company to which he or she could be 
reassigned.” Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan. City, 214 F.3d 1011, 1018 
(8th Cir. 2000).
The ADA did not require UPS to offer Faidley a position for which he was 
unqualified. See Minnihan, 779 F.3d at 814; Cravens, 214 F.3d at 1019 (“employee 
must be otherwise ‘qualified’ for the reassignment position”). When UPS made its 
first accommodation decision in July 2012, there appeared to be three reasons Faidley 
was not qualified for reassignment to a feeder driver position -- he could not meet the 
essential job function of working up to 9.5 hours per day with the eight-hour 
accommodation he requested based on Dr. Goetz’s permanent medical restriction; he 
would need additional training to possess the requisite skill, education, and training 
for this position; and there were no available feeder driver vacancies. The panel 
concluded there was a genuine issue of material fact requiring remand on this issue 
because Blood wrote on his accommodation worksheet that Faidley “preliminarily 
appear[ed] capable of performing the essential job functions” of a feeder driver, and 
there was evidence that feeder driver positions would become open in the near future. 
The EEOC supports this decision. However, we conclude that it is not supported by 
the summary judgment record and therefore Faidley was not qualified for the feeder 
driver job as a matter of law.
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It is undisputed that the ability to work 9.5 hours a day was an essential 
function of the feeder driver job. Dr. Goetz’s May 15, 2012 Status Report 
permanently restricted Faidley from working more than eight hours a day. The 
document gave no indication it was limited to Faidley’s current package car driver 
position. Faidley and the EEOC argue it was ambiguous whether Dr. Goetz intended 
the medical restriction to apply to any job other than package car driver. But this 
contention flies in the face of Dr. Goetz’s deposition testimony that he intended the 
eight-hour restriction to apply to other jobs:
Q: [A]s long as this [restriction] was in place, you understood that
[Faidley] wasn’t going to be able to work in a job more than eight hours;
right?
A: Right.
Q: And that’s what you intended to convey with that; correct?
A: Correct.7
Moreover, before UPS offered Faidley reassignment to other full-time positions 
which did not require overtime, Faidley submitted to the UPS accommodation review 
committee an Accommodation Checklist stating, “with an 8.0 hr accommodation, I
believe I could do any job at UPS that I ’m aware o f ___Without an accommodation,
I ’m not aware o f any jobs that I  would be able to d o ” (emphasis added). Thus,
7Faidley cites another portion of Dr. Goetz’s deposition in which he states he 
crafted the restriction with the package car driver position in mind and had no reason 
to believe Faidley could not perform the less strenuous feeder driver job. But he 
failed to present this evidence to the district court, so it is not part of the summary 
judgment record on appeal. Bath Junkie Branson, L.L.C. v. Bath Junkie, Inc., 528 
F.3d 556, 559-60 (8th Cir. 2008).
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Faidley’s own accommodation request adopted and confirmed that Dr. Goetz had 
unambiguously limited him to working eight hours a day at any position.
We have stated in prior cases that “[t]he ADA does not require an employer to 
permit an employee to perform a job function that the employee’s physician has 
forbidden.” Scruggs, 817 F.3d at 1094, quoting Alexander v. Northland Inn, 321 
F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 2003). We acknowledge that substantial objective evidence 
that conflicts with a physician’s statement may create a genuine issue of material fact 
whether the employee is qualified to perform a particular job. Cf. Holiday v. City of 
Chattanooga, 206 F.3d 637, 644-45 (6th Cir. 2000) (substantial evidence plaintiffwas 
qualified to serve as a police officer created genuine dispute, notwithstanding 
contrary assessment by employer’s contract physician). But Vince Blood’s note 
stating that Faidley “preliminarily appear[ed] capable of performing the essential job 
functions” of feeder driver is insufficient to create a material fact dispute about 
Faidley’s qualifications. It was a preliminary subjective opinion, unsupported by 
objective evidence, not materially different than the employee’s subjective assessment 
that was insufficient to create a material dispute with his physician’s restrictions in 
Otto v. City of Victoria, 685 F.3d 755, 758 (8th Cir. 2012). Moreover, reading 
Blood’s ambiguous note for summary judgment purposes as opining that Faidley 
could work 9.5 hours a day as a feeder driver, it does not create a material fact 
dispute when Faidley, the employee requesting accommodation, and his physician 
declared that Faidley could not perform this essential function of the feeder driver 
position. On this record, Dr. Goetz’s facially unambiguous restriction established that 
Faidley was not qualified to be reassigned to a feeder driver position.
Of course, nothing precluded UPS from pursuing Blood’s notation that the less 
strenuous duties of a feeder driver might permit reassignment to that position, for 
example, if Dr. Goetz were to modify his eight-hour permanent restriction, as 
happened several months later. But UPS was under no ADA duty to pursue that
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unlikely accommodation -- which would require training Faidley and waiting for a 
position to open up -- rather than pursue the inside full-time positions that Faidley 
listed in his accommodation checklist and for which he was immediately qualified. 
“[A]n employer only has to provide an accommodation that is reasonable,” not an 
accommodation the employee prefers. Scruggs, 817 F.3d at 1093; see Minnihan, 779 
F.3d at 814. The ADA prohibits disability discrimination. If an employer “bends 
over backwards to accommodate a disabled worker . . . it must not be punished for its 
generosity by being deemed to have conceded the reasonableness of so far-reaching 
an accommodation.” Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 545 (7th 
Cir. 1995).
Faidley and the EEOC argue the testimony that the UPS review committee did 
not list the feeder driver job because it was unavailable was contrary to the principle 
that “reassignment to a vacant position,” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B), includes a position 
“the employer reasonably anticipates will become vacant in a short period of time.” 
Cravens, 214 F.3d at 1019 n.5 (quotation omitted). The principle is sound but does 
not affect this case. Faidley was not qualified for the feeder driver position because 
of his permanent eight-hour restriction, so UPS had no ADA duty to propose that 
accommodation. Moreover, from a practical standpoint, Faidley wanted to return to 
work immediately, he proposed only full-time inside jobs as alternative 
accommodations if he could not return to work as a package car driver with an eight- 
hour restriction, and it was doubtful he would be found qualified for a feeder driver 
position even if one came open (as next happened in September 2012). No 
reasonable jury could find that UPS’s decision to instead pursue reassignment to full­
time jobs which Faidley had suggested, and for which he was immediately qualified, 
was disability discrimination.
C. Turning to the 2013 claim of disability discrimination, Faidley argues that 
UPS violated the ADA when it refused to accommodate Dr. Goetz’s temporary
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restrictions of working four hours per day for five weeks at the combined loader- 
preloader job Faidley won after Dr. Goetz eliminated the permanent eight-hour per 
day restriction in January 2013. Faidley argues that UPS’s excuse -- that TAW 
policies under the collective bargaining agreement precluded this accommodation -­
was both factually and legally insufficient. The panel majority upheld the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment on this issue, concluding (i) that UPS was not 
required to reallocate the essential functions of the combined position, and (ii) that 
Faidley did not present evidence that he could perform the essential functions of any 
available jobs with the permanent lifting restrictions Dr. Goetz imposed in 2013, 
including the package car driver and feeder driver positions at issue in resolving the 
2012 claim. Faidley, 853 F.3d at 452, citing Minnihan, 779 F.3d at 813. We agree.
D. Finally, Faidley argues the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment on his claim that UPS committed disability discrimination by failing to 
engage in good faith in the required interactive accommodation process. See Peyton 
v. Fred’s Stores of Ark., Inc., 561 F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 876 
(2009); Fiellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 951-52 (8th Cir. 1999). 
We disagree.
“There is no per se liability under the ADA if an employer fails to engage in the 
interactive process,” but at the summary judgment stage such a failure is “prima facie 
evidence that the employer may be acting in bad faith.” Minnihan, 779 F.3d at 813 
(quotation omitted). To establish that an employer failed to participate in an 
interactive process, a disabled employee who requested an accommodation, such as 
Faidley, must show that “the employer did not make a good faith effort to assist the 
employee in seeking accommodation; and . . . the employee could have been 
reasonably accommodated but for the employer’s lack of good faith.” Cravens, 214 
F.3d at 1021.
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Here, UPS participated in the interactive process prescribed in its ADA 
Procedural Compliance Manual when Faidley requested an accommodation in May 
2012 and again in March 2013. The UPS accommodation committee met with Faidley 
in July 2012 and May 2013 to assess whether accommodations consistent with Dr. 
Goetz’s restrictions were available, including reassignment to other jobs suggested by 
Faidley or identified by the committee. Full-time jobs for which Faidley was qualified 
were identified; he bid on several positions but lacked the seniority to obtain them. 
After the May 2013 meeting, when full-time positions Faidley could have performed 
with his lifting restrictions were not available, UPS told him it would notify him if any 
position became available and again offered him a part-time job that he rejected. 
Given these extensive efforts, we agree with the district court that a reasonable jury 
could not find that UPS acted in bad faith.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge, with whom SMITH, Chief Judge, and KELLY, Circuit 
Judge, join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree that the district court correctly concluded that Faidley was unqualified 
for the package car driver and the combination loader and pre loader positions. I also 
agree that Faidley did not present evidence showing that UPS failed to make a good 
faith effort to help him in seeking an accommodation. I believe, however, that the 
district court erred by determining as a matter of law that Faidley was unable to 
perform the essential job functions of the feeder driver position. I therefore dissent 
from the majority opinion part II.B.
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To prove disability discrimination, an employee must establish "that he (1) has 
a ’disability’ within the meaning of the ADA, (2) is a ’qualified individual’ under the 
ADA, and (3) ’suffered an adverse employment action as a result of the disability.’" 
Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 711 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting 
Duty v. Norton-Alcoa Proppants, 293 F.3d 481, 490 (8th Cir. 2002)). An employee 
is a qualified individual under the ADA if he "(1) possess[es] the requisite skill, 
education, experience, and training for [his] position; and (2) [is] able to perform the 
essential job functions, with or without reasonable accommodation." Kallail v. Alliant 
Energy Corp. Servs., Inc., 691 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Fenney, 327 
F.3d at 712). Essential job functions "are the fundamental duties of the job, but not 
its marginal functions." Id. Reasonable accommodation may require "reassignment 
to a vacant position," 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); vacant positions include positions 
"that the employer reasonably anticipates ’will become vacant in a short period of 
time.’" Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas City, 214 F.3d 1011, 1019 n.5 
(8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1187 (6th 
Cir. 1996)).
The majority concluded that Faidley was unqualified for the feeder driver 
position because the position sometimes required working more than eight hours per 
day. As the majority notes, a good deal of evidence supports this claim. Faidley 
referred in his affidavit to "the required 9.5 hours per day for that position." Human 
resources manage Vince Blood wrote on a 2012 accommodation worksheet, however, 
that Faidley "preliminarily appear[ed] capable of performing the essential job 
functions" of the feeder role. On the same form, he wrote that Faidley could work no 
more than eight hours per day. I believe that this is sufficient to create a genuine issue 
of material fact on Faidley’s claim that he was qualified to perform the essential 
functions of the feeder driver position. For this reason, I would reverse and remand 
Faidley’s discrimination claim to the district court.
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